
Jurnal Hasil Penelitian dan Pengembangan (JHPP)

Volume 4 Number 1 (2026)

<https://jurnalcendekia.id/index.php/jhpp>

Determinant of Earnings Management Practices of Manufacturing Companies in Indonesia

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Abstract: The company's demands to achieve predetermined profit targets can be a motivation to carry out earnings management. This study aims to determine the effect of managerial ownership, accounting conservatism, and information asymmetry on earnings management. The population used in this study are manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 2021-2023 period. The number of samples that match the criteria in the study was 29 companies using the purposive sampling method, and the amount of research data was 87 companies. The sampling was carried out using a regression data panel with common effects approach using EViews 10. This study indicates that managerial ownership and accounting conservatism do not affect earnings management and that information asymmetry affects negatively to earnings management.

Keyword: Management, Manufacturing, Companies, Indonesia

Introduction

The increasing business competition in the current era of globalization cannot be separated from the development of the economic, social, and political environment and technological advances (Silitonga et al, 2025). Every company need to adapt and read the situation to manage its management functions well, starting from the production, marketing, human resources, and finance, so that the company can be superior to its competitors (Pratama & Wiksuana, 2016). Management has the task of preparing and publishing financial reports. Stakeholders and investors will use the published financial reports in deciding to allocate their capital to company (Simangunsong et al, 2025). Therefore, management is motivated to show good performance in generating maximum profit for the company and optimum benefit to investor to ensure there will be sustainable growth in the future (Komala & Annisa, 2025).

A company is established to make a profit. The company needs profit to carry out the life of the company and the employees who work (Astuti & Nuraina, 2017). Financial statements can be used as an instrument for assessing management performance. Financial reports must be of good quality before being submitted because financial statement users require the information to be complete, transparent reports and

information presented on time (Darmawan & Widhiyani, 2017). Therefore, management will always strive to make its financial reports look good to users by organizing their financial data especially the company profit to be higher, lower or same for several period (Maqfiroh & Mauliyah, 2022). Financial reports are one of the objects of earnings management both in the short and long term (Asitalia & Trisnawati, 2018). Earnings management is the action of manipulating financial statements by increasing or decreasing reported earnings, often known as discretionary accruals. The discretionary accruals are carried out by management to require a change in accountant policy (Rondonuwu & Suhartono, 2023).

Managerial ownership is shared ownership by company management. According to accounting theory, managerial ownership can motivate managers to do earnings management (Pambudi, 2020). The more significant the proportion of management ownership in a company, the management will try to fulfil the interests of shareholders who are also themselves. The manager's actions to carry out earnings management that had similar interest with shareholders will decrease by increasing managerial ownership (Wijaya & Triyani, 2025). Wijaya & Triyani (2025) stated that managerial ownership had a positive effect on earnings management. Suriesh & Retnani (2023) stated that managerial ownership had negative effect on earnings management. Endiana (2018) finds that managerial ownership does not affect earnings management.

Accounting conservatism is the principle of prudence in the recording and presenting financial statements (Hotimah & Retnani, 2018). Companies do not immediately recognize assets and profits but recognize losses and debts likely to occur as soon as possible. The application of accounting conservatism does not mean that all revenues must be received before they are recognised. Income as good news information is verified beforehand whether its value is higher than recognised losses (Octaviani & Suhartono, 2021). This principle produces higher-quality financial reports so that the income and assets displayed in the financial statements cannot be overstated (Watts, 2003). Research by Wijaya & Hasniar (2018) and Mukminah et al. (2018) stated that accounting conservatism has a significant positive effect on firm value. Research by Manik (2017) and Basuki & Siregar (2019) shows that accounting conservatism has a significant negative effect on firm value.

Information asymmetry is when managers have different information about the company's prospects than those outside the company especially investors (Nuriyah & Amir, 2022). It allows management to use the information to maximize its prosperity. The higher asymmetry information about the company's internals that managers have compared to the information from shareholders, the managers will have more opportunities to carry out earnings management (Wijaya et al., 2017; Amir et al., 2022). Nariastiti (2014), Putra (2014), Wijaya et al. (2017), Cahyono & Widyawati (2019), and Rohayati (2020) stated that information asymmetry positively affected earnings management, but Hidayat (2019) found that information asymmetry did not affect earnings management.

This study aims to re-examine the effect of managerial ownership, accounting conservatism, and information asymmetry on earnings management due to the inconsistent results of previous studies. This research is a research development conducted by Alfin et al. (2020). The difference in this research is the period carried out in this study to a newer period from 2020 to 2023 and the usage of manufacturing companies registered on the Indonesian Stock Exchange as research samples, which is more recent than previous research.

Agency theory can explain the motives or actions of agents to use the principles of accounting conservatism or not in making financial statements. Agency theory discusses the existence of an agency relationship that creates a conflict of interest between the principal and the agent (Salim & Apriwenni, 2018). An agency relationship is a contract

between the principal who gives work to the agent to carry out a service that includes the delegation of several powers to the agent by making decisions in the principal's interests. In agency theory, problems often occur caused by each party who wants to prioritize the rights obtained from the company. These problems arise because the principal prioritizes the company's financial results to return their investment in the company. At the same time, the agent emphasizes compensation or bonuses in return for services that have been provided to the company (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Management can do earnings management practice with information advantage to make the profit information to mislead and not reflect the current condition (Kurniawansyah et al., 2025).

Signal theory is an action taken by a company to provide clues to investors about how management views the company's prospects. This signal is in the form of information about what management has done to realize the owner's wishes (Brigham & Houston, 2019). The information presented is an announcement and will provide a signal for investors in making investment decisions. If the information presented contains a positive value, it is expected that the market will respond to the information. The information received by market participants will first be analyzed and interpreted as a positive signal (good news) or a negative signal (bad news) (Hartono, 2017). Investors will use financial statements to make decisions because financial statements are the most critical part of a company's fundamental analysis. The higher the company's performance, this will be indicated as good news by investor (Mariani & Suryani, 2018).

Managerial ownership is the owner of company shares originating from management who participates in making decisions of a company concerned (Agatha et al., 2020). Managerial ownership is the proportion of ordinary shares owned by the management, directors, and commissioners. Managerial ownership has direct relationship with the role of manager, investor and company's interest (Komala & Annisa, 2025). According to agency theory, managerial ownership in the company will reduce agency conflicts (Fadillah, 2017). Companies with a higher percentage of managerial ownership will tend to use accounting methods that are not conservative (Siregar & Pambudi, 2019). Higher managerial ownership will encourage the management to use control rights to maximize their performance and increase the company's profit (Aditomo & Meidiyustiani, 2023).

Conservatism is a precautionary principle in financial reporting where companies are not in a hurry to recognize and measure assets and profits and immediately recognize losses and debts that may occur (Savitri, 2016; Fuada, 2021). The principle of conservatism has impacted the choice of accounting methods that report lower profits or assets and report higher debt (Watts, 2003; Andreas et al., 2017). The attitude of optimism in applying the principle of conservatism in financial reporting has a low view, especially when facing uncertainty in making measurements (Belkaoui, 2012). The principle of conservatism can make the quality of earnings published by the company considered higher than the determination of aggressive earnings. It is less likely to overestimate current and future performance expectations with a conservative attitude (Subramanyam, 2017).

Information asymmetry is an imbalance of information owned by the principal and agent when the principal does not have sufficient information about the agent's performance. On the other hand, the agent has more information about the performance condition in company than the principal (Sumantri et al., 2021). Information asymmetry makes management act unethically and tends to act fraudulently by providing helpful information for principals for motivation to obtain high bonus compensation (Feronika et al., 2021). This condition makes management take advantage of the misalignment of information to seek the benefits of the management itself and, at the same time, can

cause losses to outside parties such as biasing information related to investors (Fitriana, 2017).

Earnings management is an action that a company's management takes to influence reported earnings and mislead information about actual economic benefits that the company will have (Prasetyo & Suhendah, 2023). This action can harm the company's economic performance or affect the outcome of the agreement (contract), which depends on the figures generated (Agustia & Suryani, 2018). Every action was taken by management that can affect the reported profit figures for specific purposes by determining accounting policies or actual actions that affect earnings to achieve specific goals (Scott, 2015). Earnings management emphasizes opportunistic efforts to influence the information presented by utilizing information asymmetry (Yateno & Sari, 2016).

Managerial ownership is the ownership of company shares by the executives or directors (Widhiadnyana & Ratnadi, 2019). Management not only acts as an agent but also acts as a shareholder. Managerial ownership is shared ownership by the company's management as measured by the percentage of the number of shares owned by management. Based on agency theory, managerial ownership will reduce the conflict of interest between the principal and the interest alignment agent, where the management will no longer act selfishly (Topowijayadan, 2016). In general, it can be said that a certain percentage of share ownership by management tends to influence earnings management actions. The higher managerial ownership, the higher the incentive to carry out earnings management decreases because managers share every decision's good and bad consequences (Wijaya, 2019).

Ha₁: Managerial ownership affects earnings management negatively

Conservatism is one of the principles used in accounting. Conservative accounting is the attitude taken by accountants in dealing with two or more alternatives in preparing financial statements with the accounting standards that have permitted them (Manik, 2018). If more than one alternative is available, this conservative attitude tends to choose an alternative that will not make assets and income too large (Kurniyawati, 2019). Accounting conservatism is defined as the tendency of accountants to require a higher level of verification to recognise good news as gains than to recognise bad news as losses. Based on agency theory, this theory discusses problems that arise due to differences between the goals or desires of the principal and agent (Sarwoko, 2016). To avoid earnings management practices that can harm users of financial statements, shareholders must apply conservative accounting methods as company principals. The principles of conservatism in favour of investors tend to protect investors from investing mistakes due to errors in analysing company profit information (Tuwentina & Wirama, 2014).

Ha₂: Accounting conservatism affects earnings management negatively

Information asymmetry is when managers have access to information on company prospects that are not owned by outsiders (Suwadjono, 2014). The existence of asymmetry between management (agent) and the owner (principal) can provide an opportunity for managers to take earnings management actions, which means that the existence of information asymmetry is considered the cause of earnings management (Feronika et al., 2021). The more information about the internal company managers than shareholders own, the information asymmetry will provide little information to the investor and management about the company's financial condition. This will make the managers will have a more significant opportunity to carry out earnings management (Isnawati et al., 2023).

Ha₃: Information asymmetry affects positively to earnings management

The following figure illustrates the conceptual framework designed to examine the factors influencing earnings management. The model identifies three independent variables: managerial ownership (X_1), accounting conservatism (X_2), and information

asymmetry (X_3). Furthermore, the diagram outlines the research hypotheses (H1, H2, and H3) which represent the proposed relationships between these predictors and the dependent variable (Y).




Figure 1. Conceptual Framework

Method

This study uses a quantitative approach because the data used in this study are expressed in numbers and secondary data. The secondary data in this study were taken from annual reports and financial reports issued by manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The population in this study are manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Sampling in this study was carried out using a purposive sampling technique and resulted in 87 data from 29 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the 2021-2023 period. The following are the results of the research sample selection, presented in table 1.

Table 1. Selection Process to Choose Sample Results

Description	Amount	Accumulation
1. Manufacturing companies that were not listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in a row in 2021-2023	(39)	154
2. Companies that do not consistently publish audited financial reports in 2021-2023 in rupiah.	(11)	143
3. Companies that do not perform financial reporting in rupiah currency consistently in 2021-2023	(27)	116
4. Companies that do not have managerial ownership in 2021-2023	(87)	29
The number of company samples		29
Amount of data samples during the research period (3x29)		87

Earnings management in this study uses the modified Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995). The calculation formula in the modified Jones model (1995), which is a proxy for earnings management, is as follows:

$$\text{Total Accrual (TAC)} \\ \text{TAC}_{it} = \text{NI}_{it} - \text{CFO}_{it}$$

$$\text{Total Accrual is estimated with Ordinary Least Square} \\ \text{TA}_{it} / \text{A}_{it-1} = \beta_1 (1 / \text{A}_{it-1}) + \beta_2 (\text{REV}_{it} / \text{A}_{it-1}) + \beta_3 (\text{PPE}_{it} / \text{A}_{it-1}) + e$$

$$\text{Nondiscretionary Accruals (NDA)} \\ \text{NDA}_{it} = \beta_1 (1 / \text{A}_{it-1}) + \beta_2 (\text{REV}_{it} / \text{A}_{it-1} - \text{REC}_{it} / \text{A}_{it-1}) + \beta_3 (\text{PPE}_{it} / \text{A}_{it-1})$$

Discretionary Accruals (DA)

$$DA_{it} = (TA_{it} / A_{it-1}) - NDA_{it}$$

Description:

- PPE_{it} = Property, plant, and equipment of company i in year t
NDA_{it} = Nondiscretionary accruals of the company i in year t
CFO_{it} = Cash from operating activities of the company i in year t
ΔREV = The company's revenue in year t minus the company's revenue in year t-1
ΔREC_{it} = Accounts receivable of company i year t minus trade receivables of the company i-year t-1
NI_{it} = Net income of company i in year t
TA_{it} = Total accruals of the company i in year t
DA_{it} = Discretionary Accruals of the company i in year t
A_{it-1} = Total assets of the company i in year period t-1
ε = Error

Managerial ownership describes the percentage of share ownership by the management including director and commissioner (Kusumardana et al., 2022). Managerial ownership can be measured using the following calculation.

$$MO = \frac{\text{Total amount of shares owned by management}}{\text{total outstanding shares}} \times 100 \%$$

Conservatism is a precautionary principle in financial reporting where companies are not in a hurry to recognize and measure assets and profits and immediately recognize losses and debts that may occur. This principle results in the choice of accounting methods that report lower profits or assets and report higher debt (Andreas et al., 2017). Conservatism aims to neutralize companies' overly excessive optimism in reporting their business results. Conservatism is attributed to financial statements in debt and compensation contracts, litigation, legislative and political proceedings, and taxes (Watts, 2003). Accounting conservatism can be measured using calculations (Marlina & Anna, 2018).

$$CONACC_{it} = ((N_{it} + \text{Depreciation}_{it} - CFO_{it}) / \text{Total asset}_{it}) \times -1$$

Description:

- CONACC_{it} = The level of accounting conservatism owned in the company i for period t
N_{it} = Net income of company i in period t
Depresiasi_{it} = Depreciation of company i in period t
CFO_{it} = Cash flow operations of company i in period t
Total Asset_{it} = Total asset yang dimiliki perusahaan i pada periode t

Information asymmetry is condition which manager had more information than stakeholders. The bid-ask spread formula will measure the information asymmetry variable in this study by using bid-ask spread to observe information announcement for seven days before announcement date, one day for announcement date, and seven days after announcement date (Sumantri et al., 2021). The bid-ask spread is the difference between the highest bid price and the lowest ask price for a stock (Pramesti & Budiasih, 2017). The bid-ask spread is calculated using the following formula.

$$SPREAD_{it} = ((ASK_{it} - BID_{it}) / (ASK_{it} + BID_{it}) / 2) \times 100\%$$

Description:

- SPREAD_{it} = The difference between the lowest selling price and the highest buying price for company's stock
ASK_{it} = The highest selling price of company's share i period t
BID_{it} = The lowest purchase price of company's share i period t

This study uses a panel data regression model estimation which is carried out using the Eviews software as follows.

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 X_{1it} + \beta_2 X_{2it} + \beta_3 X_{3it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Description:

Y	= Earnings Management
it	= Company i in year t
α	= Constant
$\beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3$	= Regression Coefficient
X_1	= Managerial Ownership
X_2	= Accounting conservatism
X_3	= Information asymmetry
ε	= Error

The approach taken in panel data regression analysis is the common, fixed, and random effect. The Chow, Housman, and Lagrange multiplier tests will be carried out to choose which model best fits the data. Descriptive statistics provide an overview or description of data seen from the average value (mean), standard deviation, variation, maximum, minimum, sum, range, kurtosis, and skewness (Ghozali, 2018). Classical assumption tests performed include autocorrelation, multicollinearity, and heteroscedasticity. This partial test was conducted to determine whether partially the independent variables used had a significant effect on the dependent variable. The coefficient of determination test measures how far the model can explain the dependent variable's variation (Ghozali & Ratmono, 2020).

Results & Discussion

Results

Descriptive Statistics

The following are the results of descriptive statistics of the variables that are the object of research which can be seen in table 2.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics

	EM	MO	AC	IA
Mean	-1.976631	0.089501	0.127670	3.950078
Maximum	9.354773	0.373200	10.35331	18.86792
Minimum	-167.2147	0.000010	-0.372468	0.000000
Std. Dev.	18.27735	0.123559	1.131227	4.501653

Source: EViews 10

Based on the results shown in table 2, the number of research samples was 87 samples. Earnings management (EM) as measured by Discretionary Accruals has a minimum value of -167.2147 at PT Alakasa Industrindo Tbk and a maximum value of 9.354773 at PT Mulia Industrindo Tbk. The average value of the earnings management is -1.976631, and the standard deviation value of the earnings management is 18.27735. Managerial ownership (MO) has a minimum value of 0.00001, while the maximum value of 0.373200 occurred in the company PT Arwana Citramulia Tbk. The average value of managerial ownership is 0.089501, and the standard deviation of managerial ownership is 0.123559.

Accounting conservatism (AC) has a minimum value of -0.372468, which occurred in PT Arwana Citramulia Tbk. The maximum value of 10.35331 occurred in PT Gudang Garam Tbk. The average value of accounting conservatism is 0.127670, and the standard deviation value of accounting conservatism is 1.131227. Information asymmetry (IA)

measured using the bid-ask spread has a minimum value of 0 for manufacturing companies that do not disclose reports related to earnings management. Information asymmetry had a maximum value of 18,86792 at PT Kalbe Farma Tbk in 2019. Information asymmetry has an average value of 3.950078 that smaller than the standard deviation value of 4.501653. These results indicate that information asymmetry has data that is too extreme.

Classic Assumption Test

The results of the multicollinearity test showed that the independent variables have no multicollinearity problem because all centred VIF values were <10. Based on the prob value. On the Breusch Godfrey Serial Correlation LM (Lagrange Multiplier) Test with the results of Prob.Chi-Square results in a value of 0.9115, which is greater than 0.05, so it can be concluded that the results in the table that have been tested do not cause autocorrelation. Based on the value of Obs*R-squared of 0.010300 and the probability of Obs*R-squared of 0.9072, which is greater than 0.05 in the heteroscedasticity test, the data in this study does not experience heteroscedasticity.

Panel Data Regression Selection

Based on the results of the Chow test, the probability value of the Chi-square Cross-section of 0.0583 is greater than 0.05, so Ho is accepted, and Ha is rejected. The test results show that the Fixed Effect model is better than the Common Effect model. Based on the results of the Hausman test, the probability value of the Chi-square Cross-section of 0.614 is greater than 0.05, so Ho is accepted, and Ha is rejected. The test results indicate that the Random Effect model is better than the Common Effect model. Based on the Lagrange Multiplier Test results, the probability value for Breusch-Pagan is 0.6973, which is greater than 0.05. The test results indicate that the selected model is the Common Effect.

Coefficient of Determination Test

The coefficient of determination is determined based on the Adjusted R-Squared value in the panel data regression test, which shows a value of 0.03469 or equivalent to 3.47%. These results indicate that managerial ownership, accounting conservatism, and information asymmetry on earnings management are 3.47%, while the remaining 96.53% is explained by other variables not included in this study.

Hypothesis Test

The results of the t-test in this study which aims to prove the effect of managerial ownership, accounting conservatism, and information asymmetry to earnings management are presented in table 3 below.

Table 3. Hypothesis Test Results

Variable	Coefficients	Prob.
	B	
Constant	2.012	0.692
Managerial Ownership	9.127	0.533
Accounting Conservatism	0.025	0.896
Information Assymetry	-0.955	0.033

Source: EViews 10

Based on the results of multiple regression analysis in Table 3, the regression equation used in this study is as follows.

$$Y = \alpha + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + \varepsilon$$

$$EM = 2.012 + 9.127 MO + 0.025 AC - 0.955 IA + \varepsilon$$

Discussion

The partial test results on the first hypothesis show that managerial ownership has no significant effect on earnings management. Hypothesis testing on managerial ownership shows a probability value of 0.533. These results indicate that H_1 is rejected, which means managerial ownership does not affect earnings management because the probability value is $0.533 > 0.05$. The results of this study are in line with those of Agustia (2013) and Yendrawati (2017), who state that managerial ownership does not affect earnings management. The results of this study are not in line with the research proposed by Aryanti & Hendratno (2017), Purnama (2017), and Arthawan & Wirasedana (2018), which state that managerial ownership has a negative effect on earnings management. The low number of managerial ownerships causes the company management to take policies to manage company profits, such as increasing reported profits. Many investors are interested in investing to increase the company's share price.

In agency theory, when one or more people employ another person to provide a service, they delegate decision-making authority to the agent. When managers have a portion of share ownership, they will act the same as shareholders from external parties to ensure that the financial statements are presented fairly and disclose the actual condition of the company. If the relationship between the agent and the principal is good, it will produce a good performance. However, if, on the other hand, the relationship between the agent and the principal experiences information asymmetry, it will cause a conflict between the agent and the principal. The relationship between owner and manager is challenging because of conflicting interests. The failure of the management, who is the owner of the company's capital, in improving the quality and process of financial reporting is due to the relatively small percentage of managers owning shares compared to the total capital owned by general investors.

The second hypothesis's partial test results show that accounting conservatism does not affect earnings management. Hypothesis testing conducted on accounting conservatism shows a probability value of 0.896, more significant than 0.05. These results indicate that H_2 is rejected, which means that accounting conservatism has no significant effect on earnings management. The results of this study are not in line with Manik (2017), Wijaya & Hasniar (2018), Mukminah et al. (2018), and Basuki & Siregar (2019). The results of this study are in line with Saputri & Mulyati (2020) who state that accounting conservatism does not affect earnings management. It is because accounting conservatism forces profit recognition. In this case, it can reduce the gap for managers to practice earnings management. Based on the signalling theory, an action taken by the company to provide clues to investors about how management views the company's prospects. Signal theory explains that the company is better than other companies. Signal theory explains that managers do signalling to reduce information asymmetry. Managers provide information through financial statements that they apply conservatism accounting policies that result in higher quality earnings because this principle prevents companies from exaggerating earnings and helps users of financial statements by presenting quality earnings and assets.

Based on the partial test results of the third hypothesis, information asymmetry negatively affects earnings management. Hypothesis testing on information asymmetry shows a probability value of 0.033, smaller than 0.05. These results indicate that H_3 is accepted, which means that information asymmetry has a negative effect on earnings management. These results align with the research that conducted by Nariastiti (2014), Putra (2014), Wijaya et al. (2017), Cahyono & Widyawati (2019), and Rohayati (2020). These results align with the research that conducted by Sirappa, et al. (2024). It is because information asymmetry is one of the factors that can affect earnings management actions. Information asymmetry can be defined as a situation formed because the principal does not have sufficient information about the agent's

performance. The principal can never determine the contribution of the agent's efforts to the actual company results. The result of this negative influence of asymmetry information to earnings management in manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange indicates that managers will have little opportunity to alter and conceal data. If the information received by shareholders or external parties is adequate and information asymmetry is low, the smaller the information gap between managers and shareholders, the fewer opportunities there are for managers to engage in earnings management.

Conclusion

Managerial ownership did not affect the earnings management in manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The results of this study follow research conducted by Agustia (2013) and Yendrawati (2017). Accounting conservatism did not affect the earnings management in manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The results of this study follow research conducted by Saputri & Mulyati (2020). Information asymmetry affects negatively to earnings management in manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. This research follows Sirappa, et al. (2024) that proved information asymmetry has negative effect on earnings management. It means that if information asymmetry increases, earnings management will decrease. The results of this study are expected to provide implications for companies in the form of information about the effect of managerial ownership, accounting conservatism, and information asymmetry on earnings management to prove the factors that influence the occurrence of management's carelessness in managing the company's financial statements. The results of this study are also expected to provide information for investors and potential investors who expect a high rate of return. The investor should not only focus on the level of profit offered by the company but also need to pay attention and analyze companies that have the potential to carry out earnings management. This study only consisted of 87 samples from 29 manufacturing companies for the three years period. The results obtained cannot be generalized due to the relatively short research period and the number of samples that do not represent manufacturing companies. Future research is expected to use a more extended research period for at least five years and increase the number of research samples representing the research population.

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